Abstract: Between 1807 and 1815, U.S. imports of manufactured goods were severely cut by Jefferson's trade embargo, subsequent non-importation measures, and the War of 1812. These disruptions are commonly believed to have spurred early U.S. industrialization by promoting the growth of nascent domestic manufacturers. This paper uses a newly available series on U.S. industrial production to investigate how this protection from foreign competition affected domestic manufacturing. On balance, the trade disruptions did not decisively accelerate U.S. industrialization as trend growth in industrial production was little changed over this period. However, the disruptions may have had a permanent effect in reallocating resources between domestic infant industries (such as cotton textiles) and trade-dependent industries (such as shipbuilding).
Introduction
Between 1807 and 1815, U.S. foreign trade was severely disrupted by Jefferson's trade embargo, subsequent non-importation measures, and the British blockade during the War of 1812. These disruptions prevented foreign manufactured goods from reaching the U.S. market, thereby protecting nascent domestic industries from import competition. As a result, new manufacturing firms were established and existing domestic producers rapidly expanded output to replace previously imported goods. When normal commerce resumed in 1815, however, a flood of imported manufactured goods (mainly from Britain) threatened to eliminate many of the new producers and set back any gains to domestic manufacturers. Although it came too late to save many of the recent domestic entrants, the tariff of 1816 helped stem the flow of imports and stabilize the situation.
While this version of events is widely accepted, an open question is whether the sevenyear trade disruption -despite the setback in 1815 -decisively accelerated America's industrialization or merely provided a temporary and short-lived boost to domestic manufacturers.
1 Limited data on early U.S. industries have prevented any clear cut answer from emerging. This paper addresses this question by using a new index of industrial production by Davis (2002) . The index can be decomposed into its constituent elements, permitting a more refined look at the impact of trade disruptions on different parts of the early manufacturing economy, such as domestic infant industries (e.g., cotton textiles) and trade-dependent industries (e.g., shipbuilding).
its purpose was to prevent further losses to the merchant marine while denying Britain and
France much needed supplies. Jefferson hoped that this "peaceful coercion" would convince the two powers to change their policy and respect neutral shipping. The embargo was a sharp blow to trade: imports for consumption fell 60 percent in 1808 from the previous year; a larger fall was prevented because American ships in Europe at the time the embargo was announced were allowed to return home and unload their cargoes.
Although domestic opposition forced the embargo to be abandoned just fifteen months Figure 1 illustrates the volatile path of U.S. trade over this period by presenting the tonnage of ships engaged in foreign trade entering U.S. ports, perhaps the best measure of import 3 North (1966) presents a measure of real imports defined as the value of imports divided by a price index of imports. The real import series is highly correlated with shipping volume, but is more volatile and suggests the embargo did not a great impact on trade. The main reason we rely more on shipping volume as our measure of trade is concerns about the coverage and accuracy of North's import price index. volume during this time.
3 Figure 2 illustrates the import shocks by presenting the change in the log of shipping tonnage. The tonnage of ships entering the United States fell 50 percent in 1808 from the previous year and fell nearly 90 percent between 1811 and 1814. U.S. import data are not sufficiently detailed during this period to provide a picture of how imports of manufactured goods were affected in particular, but it is likely that the United States was cut off from virtually all foreign manufactured goods. U.S. imports of manufactured goods came overwhelming from Britain, and the official value (real) British exports to the United States fell from £4.1 million in 1812 to just £7,000 in 1814, before jumping to £11.9 million in 1815 (Mitchell 1988, p. 495) .
The remaining U.S. trade during this period was largely conducted with the Carribean rather than
Europe and thus probably did not consist of industrial products.
Economic historians have no reason to doubt that, by keeping British manufactured goods out of the U.S. market, the trade disruptions helped stimulate domestic production by import-competing industries. Older descriptive work testifies to the blossoming of manufacturing around this period. As Taussig (1931, pp. 16-17) noted, "This series of restrictive measures blocked the accustomed channels of exchange and production, and gave an enormous stimulus to those branches of industry whose products had before been imported.
Establishments for the manufacture of cotton goods, woollen cloths, iron, glass, pottery, and other articles, sprang up with a mushroom growth. . . . It is sufficient here to note that the restrictive legislation of 1808-15 was, for the time being, equivalent to extreme protection."
But the lack of economic data from the period has impeded efforts to determine precisely how the trade disruptions affected the American economy. Given the absence of reliable annual measures of national production for the antebellum U.S. economy, more recent research has focusing on indirect measures of manufacturing activity, such as incorporations or patents, in order to provide some limited quantitative evidence on the period. Lebergott (1984, p. 126) In terms of 1850 value-added weights, the relative value-added weights are split rather evenly among Gallatin's classifications of (1) trade-dependent industries (eight series, representing 32 percent of the index's value added), (2) "firmly established" domestic industries (14 series, 27 percent), and (3) import-competing "infant" industries (five series, 41 percent). Domestic infant industries include domestic cotton consumption (a proxy for textile output), newspaper circulation, coal production, hog packing, navy vessels, music organs, hand fire engines, firearms, salt production, army wool stockings, cloth regalia, and army boots and shoes.
As would be expected of the early developing American economy, the values of the commerce and trade-dependent sub-index are larger than the sub-index of the domestic infant industries during the period under examination. 4 Figure 4 shows the relative importance of these two categories and, more importantly, the markedly different effect of the trade disruptions on them. Trade-dependent industries were adversely affected by both the embargo and the wartime blockade, but much more severely by the latter. These trade-dependent industries experienced a drop in production of nearly 70 percent between 1811 and 1814. However, production quickly rebounded after the war. Among the domestic infant industries, there does not appear to have been much import substitution during the 1807-1809 embargo, but a substantial amount during the war. Infant industry production nearly tripled between 1811 and 1814, but fell back once normal commerce resumed.
This separation reveals why total industrial production shows little sign of acceleration during this period. Any gains to domestic infant industries were largely offset by losses to tradedependent industries, thus muting any pronounced impact on manufacturing overall. The trade shocks of the 1812 to 1814 period clearly had important, temporary effects on the distribution of industrial production across these differently situated categories, but did it have more permanent effects as well? Did the trade disruptions decisively accelerate production by import-competing industries or just boost their fortunes temporarily? And was the damage done to trade-dependent industries persistent or transitory as well?
The Effect of Import Shocks on Industrial Production
The main question that we seek to answer is whether the trade disruption had temporary or permanent effects on the component levels of industrial production. If trade shocks had transitory effects on production, then temporary protection from imports would boost the level of industrial production in the short-term, but it would then revert back to the level dictated by its trend growth. If trade shocks had permanent effects on production, then temporary protection from imports would lead to a persistently higher level of output, a form of path dependence or hysteresis that Rosenbloom (2002) suggests is relevant in the cotton textile industry. This section considers three different methods for examining different aspects of this question: unit root tests, linear trend regressions, and estimates of the reduced-form link between trade shocks and production.
A. Unit Root Tests
As a first pass at this question, we can test for a unit root (stochastic trend) in the industrial production indices. The unit root test helps indicate whether any random shock to production, without reference to trade shocks in particular, has permanent or temporary effects on the level of production. If the test fails to reject the hypothesis of a unit root, then the shocks to output are persistent and have a permanent effect on the level of production. If the test rejects the existence of a unit root, then the alternative could be that industrial production is characterized by temporary deviations from a deterministic trend, although rejection of a specific null hypothesis does not imply acceptance of any particular alternative. Table 1 presents augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests for the three industrial production series. The coefficient of interest is that on the lagged level of production (") and the null hypothesis of a unit root is that " = 0. If the absolute value of the t-statistic on " exceeds the ADF critical value, then the hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected. For total industrial production during the sample period 1790-1840, the ADF test statistic indicates that the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level, i.e., we cannot reject the existence of a unit root in which some fraction of an innovation is permanent. Interestingly, for infant industry production, however, we can reject the hypothesis of a unit root. This goes against the path dependence or hysteresis story and is surprising because these are precisely the types of industries in which temporary protection might be thought to lead to permanent gains to output. In the case of trade-dependent industries, the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level, but it can at the 10 percent level and the large size of the coefficient indicates that the series exhibits substantial mean reversion. Perron (1989) argues that the conventional ADF t-statistic frequently accepts the null hypothesis of a unit-root when the true data-generating process is in fact trend stationary with a break in the intercept or the slope of the trend function. Thus, structural breaks in levels or trends in the series can bias tests against rejecting the null of a unit root. For reasons that will be discussed later, there may be a structural shift in the trend growth of overall industrial production in the early 1830s. Therefore, the second part of Table 1 examines the ADF test statistics for the period of 1790 to 1830. During this period, we can reject the hypothesis of a unit root in industrial production and in trade-dependent production at the 5 percent confidence level. Now, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis for infant production, although we can at the 10 percent level.
Thus, we conclude that the evidence in favor of a unit root in industrial production, that disturbances to production are permanent, is relatively weak.
B. Linear Trend Forecast
If innovations to production are not substantially permanent, then an alternative specification is to consider industrial production as stationary fluctuations around a deterministic trend with a stationary autoregressive component, such as:
(1) log y t = : + $ t + " log y t-1 + ( 1 DISRUPTION + ( 2 POSTWAR + e t where y t is industrial production, : is a constant, t is a time trend, and e t is a random error term.
This specification includes two dummy variables that allow for shifts in the level of production during the embargo and blockade years (DISRUPTION, taking the value of one in 1808 and from 1812-1814) and during the post-war period (POSTWAR, which takes the value of one for the period from 1817 to 1840). Table 2 presents the results from estimating this equation using the three industrial production series from 1791 to 1840. For total industrial production, in the first column, the This regression suggests that infant industries came out of the war with a significantly higher level of production than might otherwise have been anticipated. A result of virtually the same magnitude comes from asking whether infant industry production was higher in 1820 or 1825 than one would have anticipated based on a simple linear extrapolation of its trend growth from the period prior to the trade disruption. Figure 4 illustrates this by comparing actual and predicted infant industry production based on a simple forecast of production using only a constant and time trend from 1800 to 1807. In this regression, the coefficient on time is 0.045, 5 Data from the 1790s is not used in this regression because the trend rate of growth was much higher during that decade; the coefficient on time from 1790 to 1807 is 0.12 with a standard error of 0.01. 6 The interactions of the dummy variables with time are not statistically significant, suggesting that there was no acceleration of growth in industrial production during those periods, i.e., the level of production was affected, not its growth rate. In addition, other variables, such as the average tariff rate or annual estimates of gross domestic product (a potential demand-shift variable), are not statistically significant and do not greatly affect these estimates.
with a standard error of 0.007, with an adjusted R 2 of 0.89. 5 In 1820, actual infant industry production is 13 percent above the forecast production. For the period 1820 to 1825, on average, the actual is 15 percent above the simple forecast. In 1816, actual production is almost the same as predicted production, but imports were abnormally high in both 1815 and 1816 as trade was adjusting to the end of the war.
This evidence suggests that the United States emerged from the War of 1812 with a different allocation of resources between these two industrial sectors, but not more industrial production overall. 6 It is not clear that these permanent effects on the two sectors can be attributed to the trade disruptions, however, because many other factors intervened in the immediate postwar period in altering the path of industrial production. Such factors include the Tariff of 1816 (positive effect) and the financial crisis of the period (negative effect). Still, this exercise has provided an interesting benchmark.
C. Effect of Trade Shocks
To examine the impact of trade disruptions on industrial production directly, we turn to some reduced-form estimates of the relationship between the two. In many ways, the question of how import shocks affect industrial production is analogous to how oil price shocks affect GDP, the subject of a much recent research. As described in Hamilton (2003) , this analysis usually starts with a simple autoregressive distributed lag specification such as:
( 2) ) log y t = : + " ) log y t-1 + $ 0 ) log (TON t )+ $ 1 ) log (TON t-1 ) + $ 2 ) log (TON t-2 ) + , t , where y is industrial production, TON is the tonnage of ships engaged in foreign trade entering U.S. ports, and , is a random error term. The coefficient $ 0 captures the contemporaneous effect of the trade shock on industrial production. By recursive substitution, the effect of a change in tonnage at time t-1 on industrial production at time t can be represented as "$ 0 + $ 1 , the effect of a change in tonnage at time t-2 on industrial production at time t can be represented as "
, the effect of a change in tonnage at time t-3 on industrial production at time t can be represented as "
The sum of these effects gives us the total impact of a change in tonnage on industrial production.
Equation 2 is frequently estimated by ordinary least squares. However, a potential concern is that changes in industrial production and tonnage could be driven by a common factor, such as demand shocks. For example, an increase in domestic demand for manufactured goods could lead to an increase in imports and an increase in domestic production. Therefore, following Hamilton (2003) , we attempt to isolate the component of the change in trade that can be attributed strictly to exogenous, non-demand factors -namely, the embargo and war -by creating a quantitative dummy variable for the change in the log of shipping tonnage for the years 1808 and 1812 to 1815. This quantitative dummy variable is not a zero-one variable, but one that takes the actual value of the change in those specific years and is zero otherwise.
Because these shocks (all negative, except for 1815) are being driven strictly by American or
British policy decisions, all are likely to be exogenous to other factors driving industrial production, such as demand or supply shocks. This quantitative dummy variable and its lags are used as instruments in an instrumental variables estimation of equation (2). In essence, the IV approach pulls out the large and clearly exogenous components of the changes from Figure 2 . Table 3 presents the OLS and IV estimates of equation (2) for the effect of changes in shipping tonnage on total industrial production, domestic infant industry production, and tradedependent production. The first two columns relating to total industrial production show that the coefficient on contemporaneous tonnage is not associated with any significant change in industrial production. The coefficient on lagged tonnage suggests that a ten percent reduction in shipping volume results in a 0.42 percent increase (OLS estimate) or a 0.47 percent increase (IV estimate) in industrial production in the next year. This implies a relatively modest effect, but obviously a larger and more prolonged disruption to imports would have a substantial impact on industrial output. The difference between the OLS and IV results is not significant, suggesting that identification in the OLS case is really being driven by the few but large shocks around 1808 to 1815. The coefficient on the second lag on tonnage is very small and statistically insignificant.
The results are strikingly different for infant and trade-dependent industries. In contrast to the total industrial production regressions, the explanatory power of the regressions for these industries is very high, particularly for a first-difference regression. In the IV case for infant industries, the coefficient on contemporaneous tonnage indicates that a 10 percent decrease in tonnage increases production by 2.0 percent. However, the coefficients on the one and two year lags on tonnage carry the opposite sign of the impact coefficient and are sizeable enough to more than offset the initial impact of the shock. One year after a 10 percent negative tonnage shock, infant industry production is just 1.4 percent higher and two years after the shock it is essentially 7 In results we do not report, we also used the real value of imports in regressions similar to those on Table 2 . However, the econometric results are qualitatively very similar to those using shipping volume. back to where it started.
In contrast, for trade-dependent industries, a 10 percent reduction in tonnage reduces output in these industries immediately by about 4.7 percent (IV coefficient). The coefficients on the lags are again the opposite sign of the impact coefficient, but the magnitude is less and the second lag is small and insignificant. The implication here is that, one year after a 10 percent negative tonnage shock, production by trade-dependent industries is 3.2 percent lower and two years after production is 2.4 percent lower. Figure 6 depicts the impulse responses to infant and trade-dependent production from a 10 percent negative tonnage shock at time t = 1. Due to the use of annual data and only two lagged values on tonnage, the responses are very choppy and do not display any new information beyond two periods after the shock (t = 3). But the figure does illustrate that, according to the results on Table 3 , shocks to trade-dependent industries appear to be more persistent than in the case of infant industries.
7
This finding appears to conflict with the results of the previous subsection. The previous subsection concluded that after 1817 the United States had a level of infant industry production that was about 20 percent higher than one would have anticipated based on prewar trends.
Although this description of the data was not directly tied to the trade disruption itself, it is very tempting to make that attribution. However, the results here suggest that any trade shock would have only a temporary effect on the level of infant production (consistent with the rejection of a unit root, for the period 1790 to 1830 at any rate).
8 See Irwin and Temin (2001) , Table 4 and Figure 5 . 9 In forming the tariff of 1816, Congress relied heavily on the report prepared by Alexander Dallas, the Secretary of the Treasury in the Madison administration. Like Gallatin's 1810 report, Dallas considered three classes of industry, (i) mature industries that were "firmly and permanently established" and supplied most of domestic consumption, (ii) industries "recently or partially established" which supplied part of domestic consumption but, "with One plausible reconciliation of these findings is that the composition of imports was changed by the structure of the tariff imposed during and after the war. Although Figure 1 shows that the volume of imports (shipping tonnage) returned to its prewar level by 1816, the measure of import volume here comprises all imports, not manufactured goods. Even as total imports returned to their pre-war levels, imports of manufactured goods may have fallen off after the war due to tariff protection due to high wartime duties and the tariff of 1816. For example, the value and volume of imports of cotton textiles from Britain was much lower in 1816 and 1817 than it had been in 1815 or even prior to the war (although determining whether this was due to the postwar recession or the Tariff of 1816 is difficult).
8 This might account for the path dependence that Rosenbloom (2002) argues was present in the case of cotton textiles.
Indeed, it should be noted that the effects of a trade disruption are not comparable to the effects of a sizeable tariff on imported manufactured goods. An import tariff could have targeted specific types of manufactured goods without disrupting trade overall or harming tradedependent manufacturers in quite the way they were punished during this period. In addition, although it is commonly believed that the import surge of 1815 could have been prevented had the Tariff of 1816 been enacted more quickly, the surge in that year in fact paid the higher wartime duties that were still in effect (but affected trade with Britain very little owing to the embargo and blockade). proper cultivation, are capable of being matured to the whole extent of demand," and (iii) industries "so slightly cultivated as to leave the demand of the country wholly or almost wholly dependant upon foreign sources for supply." Examples from the first class included wood, hats, iron castings, window glass, leather, paper and printing. Examples from the second class included: course cotton and woolen goods, larger iron goods, and beer and spirits. Examples of the third class included: fine cotton goods, linens and silk goods, woollen blankets and carpets, china and earthenware, other glass products.
10 In April 1816, Henry Brougham stated in Parliament that "it was well worth while to incur a loss upon the first exportation, in order, by the glut, to stifle, in the cradle, those rising manufactures in the United States, which the war had forced into existence, contrary to the nature of things" (quoted in Clark 1929, p. 240) . This remark was widely noted in the United States and interpreted to mean that the import surges in 1815 and 1816 had been deliberate attempts to destroy U.S. manufacturers. Thus, some ambiguity remains about the precise impact of the trade disruptions on the allocation of resources across manufacturing industries because our measure of trade consists of overall imports, not the more relevant manufactured imports. We know that infant industry production was much higher after the war, and trade-dependent production was much lower after the war, but whether this can be attributed just to trade shocks that confronted producers is unclear.
10 A stronger conclusion is that the trade disruptions did not accelerate U.S.
industrialization overall. A piece of evidence consistent with this conclusion is that, as Davis (2002) reports, U.S. total industrial production relative to that of the United Kingdom (using the Crafts and Harley 1992 index) does not show a pronounced acceleration during the 1810s or 1820s. Rather, U.S. relative industrial output surges in the early 1830s and again in the mid 1840s.
What Differentiated Successful and Unsuccessful Industries?
The quantitative evidence presented above can be supplemented with qualitative evidence on specific industries. This qualitative evidence is suggestive about some of the factors that differentiated industries that grew during the trade disruption and continued to flourish after the war from those that grew during the disruption but floundered in the postwar period, or from those that failed to grow at all.
The industries that capitalized on the brief trade disruption were those with low barriers to entry. In the U.S. context, these were industries that were not capital-intensive or those with demanding technology requirements. In many instances, low barriers to entry also meant low barriers to exit, and thus some other element -either domestic technology or human capital -is also required if the industry "stuck" in the United States after the resumption of foreign commerce.
The cotton textile industry is one that many have believed benefitted permanently from the stimulus of the trade disruption (see, for example, Rosenbloom 2002). In her history of the early New England cotton textile industry, Ware (1926, pp. 43-44) denies that the Jeffersonian embargo helped the industry much: "the increase of mill building during these years has led to the conclusion that the artificial stimulus of the embargo was responsible for the successful establishment of the cotton industry, but in the light of the fact that mills were forced by the destruction of their markets to curtail their expansion, dismiss some of their help, and struggle to dispose of the goods left on their hands, this conclusion ceases to be convincing."
But with the later trade disruptions, there was large scale entry into the industry. Textile employment fell from 3,500 in 1816 to just 400 in 1819 and just 200 in the Census of 1820 (Scranton 1987, p. 88) .
11
If technological adoption was an important factor in textiles, other industries failed because the requisite technology had not arrived on American shores. Pocket watches were very complicated products that were imported almost exclusively from Europe before the 1850s.
Most advertised American "watchmakers" were in fact watch repairers or jewelry-makers.
However, the embargo of 1807 encouraged Luther Goddard in Massachusetts to attempt to manufacture watches domestically in his repair shop. According to Bailey (1975, 190-5) ,
Goddard made less than 500 or so watches between 1809 and 1817. The first watches made
were of poor quality and took considerable time to build; he proved unable to compete effectively with European craftsmanship. Several decades passed before domestic production was firmly established.
In the case of medicines, low barriers to entry combined with domestic human capital to ensure the continuing success of the industry after trade resumed. The production of medicines required relatively little physical capital and was often a side business of physicians. Liebenau (1987, p. 11) notes that the foundation for the U.S. pharmaceutical industry was "laid between 1818 and 1822 with the establishment of several chemical manufacturers." America had been formerly dependent on British imports for medicine, but "with the economic disorder created by the war of 1812 and its aftermath, this pattern of dependence was broken." Liebenau observes that the manufacture of most common medicines was within reach for most apothecaries, as there was little need for capital investment and only a general knowledge of pharmacy required to produce basic remedies such as quinine sulphate, opium powders, and calomel. Production of these medicines were not capital intensive, but rather human-capital intensive. And Philadelphia had large concentration of well-educated German immigrant physicians and chemists, which contributed to the advances made by the industry at this time.
The glass industry -mainly engaged in the production of window glass -may also be one in which there were low entry barriers, but there was no special human capital or technological basis to production in the United States. Davis (1949, p. 37) estimates that the industry produced 5.0 million square feet of window glass in 1810 and just 5.4 million in 1820, not much of an advance. The industry expanded rapidly during the war, but "the end of the war not only put an end to rapid expansion of the glass industry but also brought distress to many of the glasshouses that had recently begun operations." Between foreign producers and the facilities build by domestic firms, the industry suffered from excess capacity and prices fell steeply from 1815. This price collapse may have erased much of the progress of the industry in the interim. Although there were more factories after the war than before -22 in 1810 and 34 in 1820 -industry output cannot be equated with the number of firms.
Capital-intensive industries, especially those that depended upon domestic supply networks for productive inputs, were unable to mobilize resources quickly and take advantage of the disruption to imports. For example, the iron industry does not seem to have benefitted greatly from the temporary trade disruption. There is little indication of whether the industry experienced a boom in output during the few years after 1810, but whatever expansion they experienced appears to have been short lived. There were fewer furnaces in Pennsylvania in 1818 than in 1810, according to Paskoff (1983, p. 75) , and output was possibly lower as well.
Even by the late 1820s the industry had not progressed much, perhaps because sufficient domestic demand was lacking to justify fixed investment in production or supply networks (until the railroads appeared on the scene).
Just as some of the production gains proved transitory for import-competing industries, so were the production losses for export-oriented industries. The shipbuilding industry clearly lost from the trade disruptions as construction fell from 146,691 gross tons in 1811 to 32,583 gross tons in 1813. The War of 1812 was "particularly disastrous for the shipbuilders; for there was little demand for tonnage, excepting small privateers; navigation was disrupted; and owners were frequently unable to pay for vessels already building," according to Hutchins (1941, pp. 185-187) . "There is no evidence, however, that these fluctuations created such serious economic problems in the shipbuilding industry as were later to appear." Industry demand had been quite cyclical in the past and "both labor and master builders became accustomed to this oscillation, and developed alternative interests to which they could turn." Thus, when demand for ships boomed once again from 1815 until 1818, domestic construction quickly rebounded back to 155,579 tons. However, production remained relatively flat thereafter, off of its prewar trend (although the prewar period may have been artificially high due to the stimulus of the war between Britain and France).
This brief survey of industry-specific evidence suggests the following conclusions.
Industries that grew rapidly with the trade disruption and survived the onslaught of post-war
British imports, such as cotton textiles and medicines, not only had low barriers to entry (i.e.,
were not capital intensive or technologically sophisticated) but had some human capital or technological basis that allowed it to be established and retained in the United States. Industries with low entry barriers lacking these human capital or technological attributes (such as glass) may have gotten a boost with the trade disruptions but retreated with the resumption of commerce. Industries that could not even get started despite the trade disruption were capitalintensive (iron) or technologically sophisticated (watches) or lacked requisite domestic suppliers.
Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the impact of the disruptions to U.S. trade between 1807 and 1815 on import substitution by domestic manufacturers. The trade disruptions did not accelerate -23-U.S. industrialization in the sense that total industrial production was little changed by these events. However, the disruptions may have had a permanent impact in reallocating resources between domestic infant industries and trade-dependent industries. Whether this shift can be attributed solely to the disruptions themselves or to other factors, such as the structure of imports of manufactures under the Tariff of 1816, remains unclear. 
